

**ISD** | Powering solutions  
to extremism, hate  
and disinformation

**CCOA** | Coalition to Counter  
Online Antisemitism

with grant support from  
**Google.org**

# Research Compilation on Online Antisemitism

**ISD** | Powering solutions  
to extremism, hate  
and disinformation

**CCOA** | Coalition to Counter  
Online Antisemitism

with grant support from

**Google.org**

Amman | Berlin | London | Paris | Washington DC

Copyright © Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2024). Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) is a company limited by guarantee, registered office address 3rd Floor, 45 Albemarle Street, Mayfair, London, W1S 4JL. ISD is registered in England with company registration number 06581421 and registered charity number 1141069. All Rights Reserved.

[www.isdglobal.org](http://www.isdglobal.org)

## Contents

About this paper	4
The Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism	5
Introduction to Online Antisemitism	6
Antisemitic actors	7
Far-right antisemitism	7
Islamist antisemitism	7
Holocaust denial and distortion	8
Far-left antisemitism	8
Radicalised conspiracy movements	8
Ideologically hybridised antisemitism	9
Mainstreamed antisemitism	9
Conclusions	12
Annex 1: ISD Resources to Counter Online Antisemitism	13
Annex 2: Key Resources on Antisemitism by CCOA Members	15
Endnotes	16

---

## About this paper

From mainstream to extreme, from far left to far right and large platforms to fringe ecosystems, antisemitism on social media is a universal challenge. For many years and across different events, geographies and languages, ISD has sought to understand, track and analyse online antisemitism. The aim of this document is to synthesise ISD's findings, providing a summary of relevant literature as a tool for informing the work of ISD's Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism.

## The Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism

The Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism (CCOA) is a two-year project which seeks to connect actors from different sectors including civil society organisations (CSOs), policy makers, businesses, citizens' initiatives, practitioners and journalists working to counter online antisemitism. CCOA aims to create a space for organisations from France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden to collaborate, mutually upskill and combine expertise in our joint aims to combat online antisemitism.

The Pan-European coalition is structured around three core workstreams, which operate inter-connectedly to inform one another; research, policy and education. CCOA's research working group works on a pipeline of crosscutting, international analysis and research, with the objective of providing an encompassing overview of the scale and threat landscape of online antisemitism. The policy working group shares evidence-based solutions to promote advocacy and policy development. Finally, the education working group builds an international network of education practitioners to counter online antisemitism through the development of a training toolkit, amplifying best practices and promoting innovative ideas. Across CCOA's three workstreams, network members create a whole-of-society approach to tackling online antisemitism.

# Introduction to Online Antisemitism

**Antisemitism has a deep-rooted history in modern thought. Beginning in the medieval period, through the turn to nationalism in the 19th century and world wars of the 20th, it forms an intrinsic component of contemporary society. With the emergence of social media, antisemitism has not only found a new method for dissemination but adopted a new vernacular to complement contemporary crises. Like many forms of hate, social media has turbocharged the ability of antisemitic worldviews to reach and be adopted by new audiences across the world.**

Over the past years, multiple sources have documented the increasing hostility towards Jewish communities across Europe. Global crises have added to the threat landscape, including the second intifada, the COVID pandemic, and the 7 October Hamas attack. However, long before these events, Jewish communities in Europe were reporting heightened fear and experiences of antisemitism. In 2018, the largest ever survey of European Jews found 89% found antisemitism most problematic on social media. This can occur from actors both in the political mainstream and the extreme; and both on platforms which are widely used and those which foster extremist ecosystems. As Jewish communities globally have experienced, online antisemitism does not stay online, but can translate into offline forms of extreme violence, such as attacks on Jewish locations in Pittsburgh, Poway, Halle, Paris, Toulouse, Brussels and many more.

Recognising the breadth of definitions in this field of antisemitism, ISD is informed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism as 'a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed towards Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, towards Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.' This definition, accompanied by its 11 examples, has been adopted by much of Jewish civil society, 37 countries and European institutions (including the European parliament, Commission and Council), and the US government.

This paper will lay out ISD's knowledge on antisemitism across multiple actors – extreme right, Islamist, far left, radicalised conspiracy movements and mainstream communities.

## Antisemitic actors

### Far-right antisemitism


Far-right groups, networks and individuals have long circulated antisemitic narratives. Telegram constitutes a central platform for the spread of extreme-right antisemitism. A 2020 map of 208 English-language Telegram white supremacist channels<sup>1</sup> found 87.9% of channels had displayed anti-minority content, including antisemitism. In posts tied to the military in [US extreme-right Telegram chats](#), analysts observed the pervasive nature of antisemitism, including channels which displayed hostility towards the US government and referred to antisemitic worldviews. In the Irish context, ISD found far-right and ethnonationalist channels on Telegram used antisemitic slurs to dismiss counter-protests of anti-mask demonstrations during the COVID-19 pandemic. [German-language extreme-right Telegram channels](#) were found to glorify the Third Reich and explicitly blame Jews for many social ills, including economic hardships and criminality.

A [longitudinal study of the German far right](#) across multiple mainstream and alternative platforms identified 1,667 antisemitic messages, ranging from denial and distortion to conspiracy theories. The messages opposed both Jewish figures and groups, and those perceived to be Jewish due to their influence. The highest volume of antisemitic messages were collected during the May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict, in line with [wider surges in antisemitism](#).

Where extremist actors are cognisant of content moderation policies on mainstream platforms, [they typically employ coded language](#) to refer to Jewish people. Lexical codes include '88' for 'Heil Hitler' or '6MWE' for 'six million were not enough'. On TikTok, ISD found the 'sound' function was utilised to spread antisemitic content, such as the Jewish song 'Hava Nagila' which was frequently used to identify and pile hate on Jewish figures.

Gaming servers have additionally served as spaces for both extreme-right socialisation and ideological mobilisation. Antisemitism was frequently shared on the [gaming platform Discord](#) among Islamist and Catholic extremist servers respectively. In most instances, Jews were portrayed as Satanists, demons, greedy or sub-human. ISD observed posts which were both antisemitic and transphobic, claiming that Jews are trying to weaken societies by undermining binary gender norms.

Figure 1: Antisemitic keyword volumes on fringe platforms, 1 October to 24 December 2023



These trends sit in line with [broader usage of gaming platforms](#) for the dissemination of extremist ideas.

Since 7 October, [accelerationist<sup>2</sup> networks](#) have praised the attacks and called for extreme-right movements to replicate Hamas' actions in the West. This is accompanied by a three-fold increase in the number of posts using an antisemitic keyword on alternative social media platforms – including 4chan, Bitchute, Gab, Telegram and others - in the immediate aftermath of the attack. While they are not exclusively far-right forums, they are host to extensive far-right ecosystems. Through use of a keyword list of far-right terminology, this study provides a snapshot of content which is highly likely to have far-right motivations. From October 1 to December 24 2023, this keyword search methodology identified nearly half a million comments on alternative social media platforms with a high likelihood of antisemitic intent.

### Islamist antisemitism

Aspects of Islamist ideology are inherently underpinned by antisemitism, which adopts unique qualities in the online space. Research on the [digital subcultures of Gen-Z Salafists](#) found antisemitism as a consistent undercurrent, with specific proliferation on Discord. Users posted classically antisemitic visual content, such as happy merchant memes or references to Second World War-era Jerusalem Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini, who was celebrated for his support of Hitler. These 'islamogram' networks particularly opposed Mark Zuckerberg, who was perceived to be representative of a global Jewish cabal.

Social media has additionally served as a mobilisation space for offline Islamist antisemitism, for example in the case of the October 29 riots at Dagestan airport. [ISD analysis](#) identified 35 Telegram channels where antisemitic messages and misinformation about 'Jewish refugees' and an alleged Jewish threat to Muslims reached over 726,000 people.

Where Palestine is central to much of Islamist literature and thought, the 7 October attack has served as a fuel for the [uptick](#) of Islamist antisemitism. Islamist terrorist groups Islamic State and al-Qaeda have published new online campaigns motivating attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets throughout Europe, with related attacks in Turkey, France and Switzerland. This [emergent Islamist threat landscape](#) presents a new vector for the spread of online Islamist antisemitism.

### Far-left antisemitism

Across the last two decades in Europe, antisemitism has experienced a resurgence on the far left, often through framings of anti-colonialism and anti-Westernism. Definitional debates around antisemitism on the left often intersect with anti-Zionism. ISD's 'Explainer' on far-left antisemitism identifies the prevalence of conspiracy theories about Jewish money, power and political influence, which can find footing in far-left worldviews. In this regard, the exclusion of Jews from intersectional spaces, based on misunderstandings of Jews and whiteness, is also explored.

### Radicalised conspiracy movements

ISD identifies radicalised conspiracy movements as highly mobilised and decentralised extremist networks centred around conspiracy theories which promote anti-democratic or anti-government ideas. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, an increase in targeted online hate was observed in various geographical contexts, including in antisemitic rhetoric and conspiracy narratives, from highly networked actors with no formal ideological programme. Antisemitic narratives ranged from claiming the virus was engineered as a 'Zionist bioweapon' to re-purposing the 'liberal elite control' and [New World Order](#) conspiracies.<sup>3</sup> Echoing medieval stereotypes, Jews were accused of spreading COVID-19, and anti-vaxxers trivialised the Holocaust by using yellow stars, insinuating they are facing discrimination comparable to that Jews faced in the Third Reich. The social upheaval during the pandemic also boosted the

### Holocaust denial and distortion

Holocaust denial is a specific feature of antisemitic discourse which commonly, albeit not exclusively, sits in the far right. In the run up to the 2020 US Presidential Election, [ISD identified](#) 36 pages or groups on Facebook that were dedicated to Holocaust denial or frequently hosted Holocaust denial content. Among these entities, nine were classified as extreme-right, seven as anti-Zionist, 13 conspiracy theorist, five pro-Palestine, one Islamist and one Christian entity. In this period, ISD identified 2,300 pieces of content mentioning "Holofoax" on Reddit, 19,000 pieces of content on Twitter, and 9,500 on YouTube. This research formed the basis of a successful collaborative civil society campaign, where evidence based pressure led Facebook to [change its policies](#) to remove Holocaust denial content.

A 2021 study on TikTok found 26 videos in English which outright denied that six million people died or suggested that it never happened. In many instances, coded language and veiled keywords were used to spread this narrative.

In recognition of the rapidly evolving landscape of online distortion and denial, [CCOA commissioned](#) a [compendium](#) of research and policy analysis. First responding to the post-7 October landscape, contributing authors identified how across platforms and offline contexts, some discourse and offline incidents surrounding the Israel-Gaza war has relativised the Holocaust and used it as a means of attacking Jewish people. The report additionally identified the advent of generative artificial intelligence as both a challenge – where contributing researchers succeeded in prompting gen AI tools to produce distortive content – and an opportunity both for innovative educational programming and quantitative analysis methodologies.



QAnon conspiracy narrative,<sup>4</sup> which encompasses a variety of antisemitic tropes such as the blood libel myth.<sup>5</sup> This experience was near-universal across Europe. For example, in Germany, the movement expanded from Telegram on to other platforms and then offline, encompassing a wide range of actors including New Age movements, QAnon believers, Reichsbürger<sup>6</sup> and sovereignists, reactionary Leftists, anti-vaxxers, and others.

From January 2020 to March 2021, posts containing COVID-related antisemitism increased 7-fold in French and 13-fold in German. In German, QAnon Telegram chat groups were the main source of antisemitic content. Anti-vaxx discourse in France during the pandemic found Jewish public figures, including France's former health minister Agnès Buzyn, were targeted with antisemitic conspiracy narratives. Antisemitism has repeatedly cropped up in conspiracist conversation about the pandemic. Anti-vaccine discourse in Germany contained consistent underlying discussions of conspiracy narratives referencing 'elite control' and 'plandemic'. While the conspiracy movement has experienced decreasing mobilisation since European countries reduced COVID-related restrictions, echo chambers fuelling conspiracy narratives and antisemitism remain active.


### Ideologically hybridised antisemitism

Antisemitism serves as a unifying factor for diverse fringe movements. The extreme right, far left and Islamists have coalesced around antisemitic conspiracy narratives and antisemitic expressions of anti-Zionism, particularly following the 7 October attacks. Various fringe movements across ideologies promote antisemitic narratives that share certain core assumptions about Jews, resulting in unlikely cross-ideological alliances. This has manifested in cross-posting, and publishing joint social media content such as podcasts, where the podcasters agree on shared antisemitic views.

### Mainstreamed antisemitism

Online hate remains a prominent issue on mainstream platforms, with sectoral changes influencing spikes in antisemitism. Following Elon Musk's acquisition of X (formerly Twitter) in October, ISD and CASM Technology built a bespoke automated hate speech classifier, finding that antisemitic posts had more than doubled. Contrary to Musk's statement that 'hate Tweets will be max boosted',

Figure 2: Volume of potentially antisemitic tweets over time, June 2022–February 2023.



this research highlighted a very small decrease in average levels of engagement or interactions with antisemitic Tweets comparing before and after Elon Musk's takeover. This research has provided a robust evidence basis for platform accountability, for example forming the core of a European Commission-led letter by 20 national antisemitism advisors to X CEO Linda Yaccarino.

In the aftermath of the 7 October attacks, ISD and CASM Technology sought to understand changes in levels to online hate on mainstream social media platforms. Retraining existing hate speech classifiers, ISD analysts found an over 50-fold increase in the absolute volume of antisemitic comments on YouTube videos about the Israel/Palestine conflict following Hamas' attacks. Antisemitic comments peaked on 10 October 2023, while the proportion of antisemitic comments also increased by 242% when comparing the daily average before and after the attack. Labelling a sample of 1000 antisemitic comments against the examples in the IHRA definition, analysts found 39% of comments included conspiracy narratives about Jews, while 19% included classic antisemitic tropes and 12% called for extremist violence against Jews.


To develop a larger-scale analysis of antisemitic narratives since October 7, ISD and CASM Technology collected relevant comments on YouTube videos about the conflict from October 1 to December 24, 2023. A sample of 100,000 antisemitic comments was used for topic modelling to establish which themes were prominent in antisemitic discourse. Analysts found

that the majority of comments promoted conspiracy theories, either relating to established conspiracies (32%) or alleging Jewish control or influence over specific institutions (29%). Over a quarter (28%) of comments promoted classical antisemitism, including references to medieval or Christian antisemitism. Only a small proportion of comments (7%) specifically related to the conflict or Israel, with the vast majority constituting overt antisemitism. In the full report, each theme is further broken down into sub-themes. This work has been used to inform communities, governments, international organisations and regulators' response to the ongoing conflict.

Using an actor-based approach, [ISD](#) sought to map the online hate and extremist ecosystem for the UK regulatory body Ofcom. [Developing a unique classification methodology](#), 768 accounts, channels, groups and pages and nearly 300,000 hateful or extremist posts on Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, 4chan, Telegram, Twitter and YouTube were collected between 1 October 2021 and 31 March 2022. Portions of hate speech were subdivided by community targeted, with 15% of cross-platform posts targeting Jewish people.

Responding to the mainstreaming of online antisemitism, ISD worked with B'nai B'rith International and UNESCO to develop a [toolkit for civil society](#). The guide provides a threat landscape, summary of policy responses and set of recommendations for civil society engagement with relevant stakeholders to jointly combat the growth of online antisemitism. Together with partners from the World Jewish Congress, American Jewish Committee and Latin American Jewish Congress, the toolkit has been transformed into a set of capacity-building online workshops, delivered in [Europe](#), [North America](#) and [Latin America](#). This educational work is pursued throughout society, with ISD Germany's [Business Council for Democracy's](#) training for businesses and companies, including a module on antisemitism.

Figure 3: Antisemitic themes in comments on YouTube videos about the Israel/Palestine conflict.



## Case study

### The Russian War on Ukraine and online antisemitism

Like many major crises, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked a deluge of disinformation and conspiracy narratives, many of which are tinged with antisemitism. Across multiple projects, ISD has analysed the manifestations of antisemitism tied to the war in Ukraine. The issue of antisemitism is particularly pertinent in this case due to Putin's rhetoric about "Nazis in Ukraine" as well as Ukrainian President Zelensky's Jewish ancestry. Additionally, ISD has observed that Putin's supporters often justify the war by claiming that Ukraine is under control of a sinister global elite or that Russia is fighting a "New World Order".

Russia's claims to fight "neo-Nazis" in Ukraine have led in many instances to Holocaust distortion content. In certain instances, the suffering of Jewish people under the Nazi regime is being instrumentalised to degrade Ukrainians faced with war and occupations. The concern is often superficial, as German far-right conspiracy communities regularly blame the Rothschilds or Zionists for the outbreak of WWII.

Additionally, the Jewish heritage of President Zelensky was explicitly weaponised against him and Ukrainians. President Zelensky has been portrayed with an exaggerated nose or as the 'Happy Merchant' meme, drawing on stereotypical depictions of Jews. Ukraine is sometimes referred to as a 'Zionist-controlled' state.

The war in Ukraine has been baked into various antisemitic conspiracy theories, from Kyiv being an instrumental element of the New World Order, Ukraine being part of a plan for 'Greater Israel' to the 'Khazarian Mafia', a false claim that Ashkenazi Jews are the descendants of a Turkic people who lived in parts of what is today Ukraine, and oppress humanity. In grand narratives about plans by 'Globalists', 'Zionists', and other antisemitically coded terminology, the war in Ukraine is cited along the COVID-19 pandemic or climate catastrophes as crises deliberately caused to take away people's freedom. The war has also invigorated the anti-transatlantic ecosystem, often composed of the fringes of the left and right, that suspects undue Jewish influence over US foreign policy due to the US' relationship with Israel. The case of the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows how antisemitic conspiracy narratives persist and can be repurposed for any crisis.


## Conclusions

**A review of existing knowledge bases and research projects permits the identification of gaps and priority areas for future work. While ease of identification has aided the study of extremist manifestations of antisemitism, its mainstreaming remains a pressing and understudied issue. Additionally, with evolving international crises prompting waves of diverse forms of online hate, the study of the intersection of antisemitism with other forms of hate - including anti-LGBGT+ hate, anti-Muslim hate and misogyny – demands attention. These areas of research should be pursued in multiple languages and focusing on understudied regions such as Eastern Europe. As the technologies available for measuring and analysing online content evolve – such as the development of automated detection software – new opportunities open up for their application to online antisemitism on multiple platforms. Contemporary software also increasingly facilitates multi-modal studies, including analysis on antisemitism visual and audio content.**

Through the wealth of experience and knowledge of network members involved in the Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism, ISD will seek to continue collating and amplifying Jewish community voices and subject matter experts. In order to aid platform accountability with the advent of the EU Digital Services Act, robust methodologies leveraging emerging hate speech detection technologies will be seminal. In the policy field, this research should be integrated into the construction of national antisemitism strategies and regulatory frameworks. This work will also influence education, where innovative pedagogies can be rooted in identified need and understanding of the online antisemitism ecosystem. Such streamlining is the core mission of the Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism and its membership.


---

# Annex 1: ISD Resources to Counter Online Antisemitism



**The Fragility of Freedom: Online Holocaust Denial and Distortion**  
26 January 2024

This research compendium with contributions from CCOA network members considers the contemporary challenges facing the online landscape of Holocaust denial in distortion. With a foreword from the European Commission Coordinator on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life, contributing authors used mixed method approaches to consider the developing post-7 October landscape and the impact of emergent generative AI technology on online denial and distortion.



**Antisemitism on Twitter Before and After Elon Musk's Acquisition**  
20 March 2023

Research from CASM Technology and ISD has found a major and sustained spike


in antisemitic posts on Twitter since the company's takeover by Elon Musk on October 27, 2022.

Powered by the award-winning digital analysis technology Beam – and based on a powerful hate speech detection methodology combining over twenty leading machine-learning models – researchers found that the volume of English-language antisemitic Tweets more than doubled in the period following Musk's takeover.




**Online Antisemitism: A toolkit for Civil Society**  
7 April 2022

The guide provides an overview of the online antisemitism threat landscape, a summary of existing policy responses on an international and national level across a range of European contexts, and a broad set of recommendations for civil society engagement with governments, platforms and wider communities to address this challenge. This resource was written with B'nai B'rith International in partnership with UNESCO.



**Hosting the 'Holohoax': A Snapshot of Holocaust Denial Across Social Media**  
17 August 2020

By analysing the term 'holohoax', which is commonly used by Holocaust deniers, this paper examines the extent to which Holocaust denial content is readily accessible across Facebook, Twitter, Reddit and YouTube. It reveals important insights about how Facebook and Twitter provide a home to an established and active community of Holocaust deniers. This paper also demonstrates how appropriately applied content moderation policies can be effective in denying dangerous conspiracy narrators a public platform by examining how Holocaust denial content has decreased significantly in the previous year on YouTube.



**The Rise of Antisemitism Online During the Pandemic: A Study of French and German Content**  
3 June 2021

Commissioned by the European Commission, this study provides insight into the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on online antisemitism in France and Germany, analysing the platforms where such content is found, as well as the most prominent antisemitic narratives – comparing key similarities and differences between these different language contexts. The report makes a range of policy recommendations based on these findings, laying out the importance of a comprehensive framework for digital regulation, the need for increased awareness of the diverse manifestations of antisemitism contained within the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's working definition, as well as the importance of measures to address the proliferation of 'grey zone' legal but harmful antisemitic content.

## Reports

[The German Far Right Online: A Longitudinal Study](#), 23 January 2024

[Hate of the Nation: A Landscape Mapping of Observable, Plausibly Hateful Speech on Social Media](#), 19 September 2023

[Tangled Web: The Interconnected Online Landscape of Hate Speech, Extremism, Terrorism and Harmful Conspiracy Movements in the UK](#), 19 September 2023

[Researching the Evolving Online Ecosystem: Telegram, Discord & Odysee](#), 27 April 2023

[Telegram as a Buttress: How far-right extremists and conspiracy theorists are expanding their infrastructures via Telegram](#), 24 October 2022

[Islamogram: Salafism and Alt-Right Online Subcultures](#), 16 November 2021

[Inspiration and Influence: Discussions of the U.S. Military in Extreme Right-Wing Telegram Channels](#), 13 October 2021

[Hatescape: An In-Depth Analysis of Extremism and Hate Speech on TikTok](#), 24 August 2021

[Layers of Lies: A First Look at Irish Far-Right Activity on Telegram](#), 12 April 2021

[COVID-19: aperçu de la défiance anti-vaccinale sur les réseaux sociaux](#), 1 April 2021

[Krise und Kontrollverlust: Digitaler Extremismus im Kontext der Corona-Pandemie](#), 05 November 2020

[A Safe Space to Hate: White Supremacist Mobilisation on Telegram](#), 26 June 2020

[The Online Ecosystem of the German Far-Right](#), 10 February 2020

[Mapping hate in France: A panoramic view of online discourse](#), 22 January 2020

## Digital Dispatches

[Appraising the Islamist extremist landscape after 7/10](#), 8 March 2024

[Antisemitic riots in Russia: How misinformation spread online fueled violence](#), 20 December 2023

[Cross-ideological antisemitism and the October 7th attacks](#), 15 December 2023

[Unpacking antisemitic narratives about the Hamas attack and the Israel-Hamas Conflict within YouTube comments](#), 4 December 2023

[Condemn, condone, converge: German extremist and conspiracist responses to the Israel-Gaza crisis](#), 23 November 2023

[UK far-right extremist reactions to the Israel-Palestine conflict](#), 17 November 2023

[Hate united: Neo-Nazi accelerationist support for Hamas](#), 13 November 2023

[Islamist groups unite around Israel attack, diverge on Hamas](#), 6 November 2023

[Rise in antisemitism on both mainstream and fringe social media platforms following Hamas' terrorist attack](#), 31 October 2023

[Understanding antisemitism on Twitter after Musk](#), 30 March 2023

[Antisemitic Hate Network Manipulates Media Coverage to Amplify its Propaganda](#), 9 June 2022

[An Antisemitic Conspiracy Theory is Being Shared on Telegram to Justify Russia's Invasion of Ukraine](#), 5 May 2022

[From Left to Right: An Overview of the 'Veiled' Antisemitism Threat Landscape Online](#), 28 April 2022

[German-Language Antisemitic Comments on YouTube](#), 22 February 2022

[The Rise of Antisemitism Online During the Pandemic](#), 8 June 2021

## Explainers

[Far-Left Antisemitism](#), 2023

## Annex 2: Key Resources on Antisemitism by CCOA Members

This additional resource list recommends analysis, policy and education work by CCOA network members, to be edited on a rolling basis.

[‘History under attack: Holocaust denial and distortion on social media’](#), UNESCO, 2022.

Matthias Becker, Laura Ascone, Matthew Bolton, Alexis Chapelan, Pia Hauptelshofer, Alexa Krugel, Karolina Placzynta, Marcus Scheiber and Victor Tschiskale, [Celebrating Terror: antisemitism online after the Hamas attacks on Israel: Preliminary Results I.](#), Decoding Antisemitism, 2023.

[‘Decoding Antisemitism: An AI-driven Study on Hate Speech and Imagery Online’](#), Decoding Antisemitism, February 2024.

Joanna Damaszkó, Marcin Napiórkowski, Krzysztof Polak, Marzena Żurawicka, Marta Bierca, Dorota Wiszejko-Wierzbicka and Marcin Napiórkowski (ed.), [‘What do Poles see when they see a Jew?’](#), POLIN Museum, 19 December 2023.

[‘Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism; Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU’](#), European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018.

Monika Hübscher, [Algorithmic Antisemitism on Social Media](#). In [The Routledge History of Antisemitism](#) (pp. 364-372). Routledge. 2023.

Monika Hübscher and Sabine von Mering (eds.), [Antisemitism on Social Media](#) (Routledge 2022).

Lisa Kaati, Katie Cohen, and Björn Pelzer, [‘Antisemitism in Social Media – Conspiracies, Stereotypes, and Holocaust Denial’](#), Swedish Defence Research Agency, October 9 2021.

Joe Mulhall (ed.) [‘Antisemitism in the Digital Age: Online Antisemitic Hate, Holocaust Denial, Conspiracy Ideologies and Terrorism in Europe’](#), Amadeu Antonio Foundation, Expo Foundation and HOPE not Hate, 2021.

[‘National Report Card on Government Measures to Counter Antisemitism and Foster Jewish Life: Italy’](#), CEJI, October 2023.

[‘Antisemitic Incidents in Germany 2022’](#), RIAS, 27 June 2023.

## Endnotes

- 1 ISD defines white supremacy as the belief in the superiority of whites over non-whites, and that white people should be politically and socially dominant over non-white people. This can extend to a belief in the need for violence against, or even the genocide of, non-white people.
- 2 Accelerationism' is a term used by white supremacists and other extremist groups to refer to "their desire to hasten the collapse of society as we know it".
- 3 The New World Order conspiracy theory claims that a shadowy global elite is trying to implement a single, totalitarian world government. It often incorporates antisemitic narratives such as Jewish people controlling major financial and media institutions and manufacturing major world events.
- 4 QAnon is a conspiracy theory that first emerged on the platform 4chan in 2017 and describes an elaborate conspiracy involving elected officials in the United States as part of a Satanic cabal which eats children. It further states that former President Trump was the only person capable of dismantling this cabal, thereby saving the United States.
- 5 The term "blood libel" refers to the centuries-old false claim that Jews systematically murder Christians, especially children, to use their blood for ritual purposes such as the baking of Passover matzah.
- 6 Germany's Reichsbürger ("Citizens of the Empire") movement stipulates that the Federal Republic of Germany is not a sovereign state and that they are thus not bound by German laws, which has led to a foiled coup-d'état attempt last year. For more information, please see this ISD explainer.



**ISD** | Powering solutions  
to extremism, hate  
and disinformation

**CCOA** | Coalition to Counter  
Online Antisemitism

with support from  
**Google.org**

Amman | Berlin | London | Paris | Washington DC

Copyright © Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2024). Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) is a company limited by guarantee, registered office address 3rd Floor, 45 Albemarle Street, Mayfair, London, W1S 4JL. ISD is registered in England with company registration number 06581421 and registered charity number 1141069. All Rights Reserved.

[www.isdglobal.org](http://www.isdglobal.org)